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ABSTRACT
This report examines corporate inversions to determine whether this practice benefits the
majority of stakeholders or merely a select few. A sample of firms previously incorporated in
the United States that have since undergone inversions is examined to answer this question.
Annual stock price returns, stock price volatility, and earnings per share changes from the
sample of inversion firms are the main sources of data examined. These results are compared
to the S&P 500 and peer firms to determine whether the changes can be attributed to the
inversions, or are merely a result of general economic conditions. Supporting topics addressed
in this paper include an overview of legislation related to inversions and suggestions to
mitigate the negative consequences of inversions. This study shows that there are no
observable benefits to shareholder wealth arising from corporate inversions. While there were
changes in the data from pre to post inversion, they were not unique to the inversion firms as
the same changes were observed in the peer firms. However, the study showed that there is a
fundamental difference between inversion firms when compared to the S&P 500.
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INTRODUCTION
With the growing prevalence of corporate inversions, an important question has yet to be
answered. This project focuses primarily on shareholders who have been affected by
corporate inversions that have taken place since 2008. Although inversions have been
occurring for over 30 years, almost half have taken place since 2008. The impact of inversions
on stakeholders prior to 2008 would not have been affected by the most recent legislation or
economic conditions, which would not aid in drawing conclusions about inverting firms
today. It can be assumed that corporate executives of the firm doing the inversion benefit
from the practice, or else they would not allow the firm to engage in it. These executives are
affected on the basis of salary increases, bonuses, and stock options due to positive impacts of
the inversion on the firm’s tax liability. Shareholders can be affected by the actions of a firm
in the form of changing stock price as well as dividend payments based on earnings per share.
Additionally, the United States government is largely involved in the consequences of tax
inversions because they lose billions of tax dollars every year as a result of firms
reincorporating outside of the United States. This is the reason behind the multitude of recent
legislation summarized in the literature review.

This project serves to provide a critical analysis of the beneficiaries of corporate inversions.
Through this analysis it will be determined whether inversions disproportionately benefit
executives at the expense of other stakeholders. If this is true, then legislation and public
sentiments condemning inversions are justified and should continue. This is because the
primary duty of executives is to generate shareholder wealth. Additionally, knowing whether
shareholders benefit from inversions will be a useful tool for investors in the future as they
can avoid risky investments in companies that plan to do an inversion. If corporate inversions
do generate shareholder wealth, then companies that have the potential to do an inversion
should be sought after by investors. Regardless, the implications of inversions on the tax
burden and tax base could explain the government’s opposition to inversions. Finally, this
project can be used as a future reference for other studies as the government continues to pass
legislation that makes it more difficult to do inversions. Future projects may find it useful to
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know whether this legislation is well founded and can use the data collected as a starting point
to compare to future data.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Key Terms
In order to fully understand incentives to invert and legislation surrounding corporate
inversions, there are several key terms which readers must be familiar with. One resource that
is included in many different tax avoidance methods is a controlled foreign corporation,
referred to as a CFC. A CFC is a subsidiary of the U.S. domestic corporation in which control
is determined by shares owned by the domestic corporation. The CFC can conduct foreign
business on behalf of the domestic corporation without incurring the U.S. corporate tax.
Instead, the CFC adheres to the tax laws of the foreign country that it is incorporated in. The
CFC can be used in various methods, discussed later, in which they conduct global business
on behalf of the domestic parent and make loans to the parent company.

It is also important to understand the distinction between a worldwide tax system and a
territorial tax system. A country with a territorial tax system only taxes a company when it
does business in that country (Yang, 2016, Corporate inversion strategies 48). Companies that
are incorporated in a country that uses a territorial tax system do not have to pay that
country’s corporate tax if they do business outside of that country and bring the proceeds from
those transactions back to the country of incorporation. A worldwide tax system on the other
hand taxes firms incorporated in that country on earnings no matter where they do business.
The United States and China are the only two countries that use a worldwide tax system
(Yang, 2016, Corporate inversion strategies 48). In the United States, this means a 35%
corporate tax on all transactions conducted in the U.S., and firms have to pay the difference
between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the tax rate of the other country in which they did
business. For example, if a U.S. company conducts business in a country that has a 20%
corporate tax rate, they will pay the 20% tax in that country, as well as a 15% tax when the
money is repatriated to the United States.
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Introduction
The study of corporate inversions has become a very relevant and contemporary issue because
the number of corporations that engage in the practice has been increasing at an increasing
rate since the 1980’s. To this point over 80 U.S. companies have undergone corporate
inversions for various reasons. A common misunderstanding concerning corporate inversions
is that companies only attempt to change their domicile for the potential to lower their
effective tax rate. While this is true in many cases, there are several more incentives caused
by tax legislation that push companies out of the United States. This trend has been causing a
constant erosion of the U.S. tax base to a degree, and potentially has unintended consequences
on the stockholders of these firms. This study takes new steps into the examination of
corporate inversions by addressing the question of whether stockholders are
disproportionately benefited by inversions compared to executive officers.

The answer to this question is clearly valuable to investors who are considering what to do
with currently owned stocks that are involved in a tax inversion deal. However, this study
may also be used to substantiate claims that reform in the tax code is a necessary step in
reducing the number of inversions. In addition to individuals in the accounting field who may
be affected by dealing with companies who have already undergone or are considering
inversions, economists may utilize the study to examine how the loss of government tax
revenue is affecting the micro and macro economy. Lastly, people studying legislation need to
be aware of recent developments as Congress has been cracking down on inversions. They
have done this through passing temporary regulations, adding notices to the IRS tax code to
close loopholes, and increasing the costs of corporate inversions to make them less attractive
for corporations seeking to reap the benefits of corporate inversions.

As previously mentioned, the question examined by this study is whether or not various
stakeholders in corporations who undergo corporate inversions benefit disproportionately or
are even worse off, post-inversion. The literature on this topic is examined to gather insight on
how the corporate inversion trend grew to its current popularity as a business practice.
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Background
While corporate inversions are being addressed increasingly in the news and in political
policy discussions, it is not a new corporate strategy. In fact, corporate inversions have been
in practice since 1983, when the first U.S. company, McDermott International, reincorporated
from the U.S. to Panama. It took ten years until in 1993, Helen of Troy also used an inversion
to access overseas funds. Even with that large gap between the pioneers of inversions, 29
inversions took place in the 20 years between 1983 and 2003. The trend continued and
increased in popularity rapidly in the ten years following, where 47 additional companies
inverted between 2004 and 2014 (Ways and Means, 2014). Today, even against resistance
from legislators and public sentiment, high profile firms continue to plan inversion deals
worth hundreds of billions of dollars due to the benefits associated with corporate inversions
(Novack, 2014).

Clearly, many firms have done a corporate inversion in the last several decades. The
incentives to invert includes lowering their effective tax rate, escaping the worldwide tax
system, and avoiding the repatriation tax since many have foreign income that are
permanently reinvested. A study conducted using Fortune 500 companies identified the
magnitude of permanently deferred foreign income. According to the study, “By the end of
2014, the 286 Fortune 500 companies that report holding offshore cash had collectively
accumulated over $2.5 trillion that they declare to be “permanently reinvested” (McIntyre,
2015, 10). This already massive and growing pool of un-repatriated earnings plays a major
role, among the other factors, in incentivizing firms to plan inversion deals.

When examining corporate inversions, it is important to determine how the massive
accumulation of overseas funds came into existence in addition to how firms carry out
inversions. This is because it is a primary incentive that causes firms to invert. Harold
McClure analyzes several different case studies of inversions throughout the last 34 years to
describe the different methods used during that time to stash their funds abroad and
subsequently invert to access those funds. McClure describes a proposed strategic move by
one of the most well-known and profitable corporations in the world. He states that Wal-Mart,
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a company with $72 billion in sales and $2.5 billion of profit from the United States is
considering re-domiciling in Switzerland (McClure, 2014, 10). What this means is that WalMart would renounce its citizenship as a U.S. corporation and move its tax address to the
foreign country while continuing to operate in the U.S. and around the world like it always
has. While the operations of Wal-Mart go completely unchanged, the way they are taxed
becomes completely different. Rather than being subject to a worldwide 35% corporate tax
from the United States, they would only pay that corporate tax on operations in the U.S.
Additionally, they would be free to only pay the tax rate of other countries that they do
business in, like Switzerland, which has a corporate tax rate just below 18%. It is very logical
for companies to seek this tax savings when no movement of assets is required in most cases.
Marian makes the point that it, “makes no business sense,” to dislocate assets during the
inversion process (Marian, 2015, 72). This is because the time and costs of transferring assets
is unnecessary for the process and the gains from tax savings would be offset by the costs of
dislocating those assets. This is the classic and simplest form of an inversion; however recent
legislation has made it more difficult for firms to leave the United States. Today the
requirements for a firm to invert are much more complicated and costly than simply
renouncing their citizenship.

Early in the history of inversions, the company Helen of Troy used a tax avoidance method
known as transfer pricing to achieve substantial tax savings and move their earnings abroad.
The company, which sells various housewares and personal products, acts as a distributor and
incurs operating expenses for a portion of sales. A parent corporation in Bermuda owns most
of the intangibles belonging to the company, and purchases the products from the U.S.
company and proceeds to sell them to worldwide affiliates. In this way, the Bermuda parent
company is able to capture a majority of sales while incurring minimal operating expenses.
This is very advantageous because there is no corporate income tax in Bermuda which means
the parent company can retain all profits. Additionally, the U.S. domestic corporation reduces
their taxable income by taking on most of the operating expenses. In this way, the model
provided by McClure estimated an effective tax rate for Helen of Troy of 14.4%, far lower
than the 35% corporate tax rate in the U.S. (McClure, 2014).
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McClure also gives an example of tax avoidance that could one day incentivize Walgreens to
invert. An important distinction raised between Walgreens and Wal-Mart that must be noted
is that Walgreens does business almost exclusively in the United States, while Wal-Mart is
clearly a more global business. The benefit Walgreens would receive is known as earnings
stripping. While they would still have to pay the high U.S. corporate tax, they could utilize a
controlled foreign company, known as a CFC, to transfer U.S. income abroad. This is
achieved primarily through intercompany debt, or royalty payments on use of intangible
assets such as patents (McClure, 2014, 11). The difference between the advantages in these
two cases is that the first granted immunity from the worldwide tax system of the United
States, while the second allowed a company still based in the United States to shift its
domestic income abroad to avoid the tax.

A final tax avoidance method worth discussing is known as a hopscotch loan. Under U.S. tax
laws, a loan from a CFC to the U.S. domestic corporation is treated as a dividend and is
taxable. In order to avoid this tax, a foreign parent corporation is required. The foreign parent
is created in a tax haven as a parent corporation to the CFC. The CFC can then resume
making intercompany loans to the foreign parent without passing the funds through the U.S.
domestic corporation, thus avoiding the tax (Yang, 2016, Corporate Inversions 44).

In the subsequent section discussing government legislation responding to the inversion trend,
it can be seen that many of the tax avoidance previously discussed become unviable. As a
result, firms must consider enacting a corporate inversion in order to access their overseas
cash. A common method of inversion that allows a corporation to change its tax domicile
requires the use of a foreign corporation to take part in a merger. As described by Marples
(2014), the U.S. company can seek a smaller foreign company to acquire, or can be acquired
by a larger foreign company. In the first situation, the U.S. shareholders retain control of the
company by owning a majority share while the company is still allowed to reincorporate in
the country of the acquisition target. Marples cites the Eaton Cooper merger as an example of
this inversion method where Eaton acquired Cooper while retaining 73% majority share and
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incorporating the new company in Ireland where Cooper was already incorporated (Marples,
2014, 3). The tax savings in this deal were substantial in that of the total cost savings of $535
million, $165 million were tax related savings (Marples, 2014, 4). In the second situation the
tax implications are very similar, but control of the company shifts to the foreign acquiring
company because they own the majority share of the new merger. An example of this
situation was the merger between the larger United Kingdom firm Ensco, and the smaller U.S.
firm Pride. After the merger, Pride became the minority shareholder in the company and
moved their tax domicile to the United Kingdom where the parent company was located
(Marples, 2014, 3). Regardless of the direction of the acquisition, the result is tax savings on
international operations for the U.S. company involved in the merger.

It is simple to understand why legislators are attempting to close tax loopholes and prevent the
validity of inversion methods when the amount of lost tax revenue is identified. In order to
understand how the U.S. economy got to where it is today, with over $2.5 trillion of
permanently reinvested funds and dozens of expatriated firms, one must understand the
current legislation affecting inversions. The following section outlines the details of IRS
section 7874, various rules that inversion companies must meet, and legislative notices
relating to section 7874.

Significant Legislation
The following section is a breakdown of the tax laws pertaining to inversions, broken down
by location in the tax code. These laws and regulations are important to the study because
they show attempts by the U.S. government to prevent inversions by making it more difficult
to set up an inversion deal. Additionally, they close many of the tax loopholes that the
previous inversion methods exploited. This makes many of the previous methods impossible
to use after the passage of regulation.
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IRS Section 7874


In effect since 2004 (DiFronzo, 2016, 50).



Developed to prevent inversion transactions that did not result in a significant
change in ownership or operations of the corporation (DiFronzo, 2016, 49).



Requires the foreign acquirer to own “substantially all of the properties of the U.S.
corporation” (DiFronzo, 2016, 49).



The domestic corporation interest holders must hold certain amounts of stock in
the foreign corporation (DiFronzo, 2016, 49).



The new group of companies must have substantial business in the country where
the foreign acquiring company is located (DiFronzo, 2016, 49).



The 80/60 rule under section 7874 requires the ownership fraction of the U.S.
corporation to be at least 60%, but less than 80%. If it is higher than 80% it will be
treated as a U.S. company for tax purposes. (DiFronzo, 2016, 49).



If there is a gain on the transfer of stock during the inversion process, an excise tax
is imposed on shareholders (DiFronzo, 2016, 50).

Temporary Regulations Under Section 7874


Disregards foreign stock from requirement included in the 80/60 rule when the
foreign acquiring company has made other U.S. acquisitions in the last 36 months
before acquisition (DiFronzo, 2016, 48).



Disregards transactions that make the domestic company smaller prior to the
inversion (DiFronzo, 2016, 48).



Parent of the foreign acquiring company must be a tax resident in the same country
as the foreign acquiring company (DiFronzo, 2016, 48).

Notice 2014-52


If less than 25% of business activity takes place in the foreign parent’s home
country, the foreign parent is treated as a U.S. corporation (Ruffner, 2015, 16).
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U.S. companies can no longer access funds from CFC’s via hopscotch loans
(Ruffner, 2015, 16).



All investments, loans, or stock purchases from CFC to domestic company or
foreign affiliates are treated as dividends (Ruffner, 2015, 16).



Stock related to the 80/60 rule requirement is disregarded if 50% of the assets
belonging to the foreign parent are passive, such as cash and marketable securities
(Ruffner, 2015, 17).



Limited ability to create a separate entity out of an existing business unit to
participate in an inversion (Ruffner, 2015, 17).

Notice 2015-79


CFC substantial business test requires CFC to conduct 25% of business and be a
tax resident of its own foreign country (Yang, 2016, Corporate Inversion Strategies
52).



Second CFC’s created before mergers to dilute U.S. equity share is not included in
calculation of 80/60 rule (Yang, 2016, Corporate Inversion Strategies 52).



Stock issued by CFC to foreign shareholders for passive assets is ignored (Yang,
2016, Corporate Inversion Strategies 52).

Section 367


Asset dilution rule requires foreign subsidiaries to recognize gains on property
transferred to a foreign transferee corporation (New Rules, 2016, 3).



Post-inversion acquisitions by CFC’s of the foreign parent’s debt or equity
interests are treated as U.S. property (DiFronzo, 2016, 49).



CFC’s will remain a U.S. subsidiary even if given a majority equity position by the
foreign parent (DiFronzo, 2016, 49).
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Research Comparison
The articles consulted for this study were very homogenous in some aspects, yet varied
widely in others. In examining the corporate inversion trend, the authors of the articles had
varied explanations for the factors that incentivize firms to seek inversions. However, most
researchers on this subject tend to agree on the fact that elements of the tax system in the
United States act as a force to push firms to reincorporate abroad. Lastly, the consequences of
inversions had mixed descriptions depending on the article.

With the complexity of inversions in general, in conjunction with the different types of firms
and conditions that affect the inversions, it is unsurprising that researchers come up with
varied explanations for the factors that provide incentive for inversions. According to
Clausing (2014), the biggest incentives include growing stockpiles of overseas cash,
anticipation of a tax holiday, and a follow the leader effect (Clausing, 2014, 1). As was
mentioned earlier, the amount of permanently reinvested funds from U.S. corporations is over
$2.5 trillion dollars. This stockpile of un-repatriated funds carries two connected effects with
it. First, firms are incentivized to invert so that they have access to this overseas cash without
paying the U.S. corporate tax upon repatriation. Second, the longer the stockpile goes without
repatriation, the higher the cost in taxes that will be incurred. Clausing’s second incentive that
firms are anticipating a tax holiday perpetuates the growth of the overseas stockpile, thus
feeding back into the first incentive mentioned. The follow the leader scenario that Clausing
alludes to is that as some firms are successful in completing corporate inversions and show
economic improvement, more firms are incentivized to emulate the same strategy.
Additionally, competing firms will feel the need to invert simply to remain competitive with
firms that are already reaping the benefits of corporate inversions. Sheppard also cites this as
being a factor that causes firms to invert. Buckstein offers very different incentives explaining
why some firms choose to attempt corporate inversions. Buckstein claims that in a globalizing
world, firms are looking for ways to expand their business and gain access to human capital
(Buckstein, 2014, 1). What he is stating is that due to the high costs of expanding a business
into a global market, inversions can help mitigate that cost by lowering taxes and merging
with a firm that has already established global connections. Additionally, the global
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connection to an acquiring firm can help a business become exposed to new talent in the form
of human capital.

When it comes to discussing the consequences of inversions, researchers agree on more
issues, yet still debate the observed outcome of others. For example, Desai and Hines agree
with Frydam that managers of firms carrying out corporate inversions are acting in the best
interest of the shareholders. While some studies examining the short term effects of inversion
news on stock price show that changes in stock price can be volatile, they observed that
shareholder wealth is maximized in the form of capital gains (Desai, 2002, 4). Sheppard also
supports this claim by stating that inversion deals have to be approved by the shareholders and
in that sense, the shareholders would not vote to carry through with the inversion if they did
not believe that they would gain from the strategy (Sheppard, 2002, 560). Another point that
researchers and legislators agree on is that the inversion trend is eroding the tax base of the
United States. Sheppard cites this in his article as a definite consequence of inversions and is
supported by Clausing who cites a study that claims simply limiting some aspects of
inversions will save $19 billion in tax dollars over 10 years (Clausing, 2014, 6). Where some
researchers differ, involves the impact of inversions on jobs and capital. Many feel that
inversions result in an exodus of jobs from the domestic country. Desai claims in his paper
that the firms that are most likely to invert are those that are large and possess a large number
of physical assets abroad. Clausing also makes the assertion that after the last tax holiday in
2004, there were no new jobs created, making it unlikely that the government will have
another in the near future (Clausing, 2014, 5). This counters the claim that a tax holiday
would be a possible solution for the issue of stopping the trend. Sheppard takes a different
stance on this matter, claiming inversions do not reduce the number of jobs because the
operations of a firm are unchanged after an inversion. Rather, the tax laws affecting the
corporation is the only aspect changed as a result of an inversion (Sheppard, 2002, 559). Rao
also claims that an unintended consequence of prohibiting easy forms of inversions has
caused the spike in foreign mergers and acquisitions, which is one of the more popular
inversion methods today (Rao, 2015, 21).
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The component of all the studies that is the most homogenous is the perception of the current
United States corporate tax system. Most researchers agree that the high tax rate itself is a
factor that pushes firms away from the U.S. However, the fact that firms such as Burger King
Worldwide Inc. move their domicile to a country with a similar effective tax rate points to the
worldwide tax system as being a primary motivator for firms to leave the U.S. All of the
researchers who provided potential solutions to stopping the inversion trend stated that the
U.S. should adopt a territorial tax system like the rest of the world. While this move is highly
unlikely due to impact it would have on the government’s tax revenue, Sheppard expresses
the belief held by many other researchers that simply lowering the corporate tax rate by 5%
would reduce the number of inversions as well as limit the practice of earnings stripping
(Sheppard, 2002, 571). Buckstein supports this action as well by stating that lowering the tax
rate would put the United States in a position to be much more competitive in terms of being a
desired corporate destination, yet makes the point that a lower tax rate should be a part of a
larger widespread overhaul of the tax system (Buckstein, 2014, 1). While these are the main
points of agreement among researchers, there are also other proposed solutions pointed out by
Clausing and Sheppard such as raising the foreign parent equity requirement associated with
the 80/60 rule, limiting cash transfer methods, and pressuring tax haven countries to change
their laws. While some of these proposed solutions may be very radical and different, the
theme of reducing the number of inversions is constant.

The research conducted in the majority of these articles was qualitative. Inversions were
studied by describing the attributes of the companies that had done inversions and the
methods that they used to complete the inversion. The descriptions of the inversion methods
were supplemented by summaries of the legislation passed concerning the taxation of inverted
corporations. This was primarily concerning IRS Code Section 7874 and supplemental notices
such as 2014-52 and 2015-79. The conclusions drawn from these studies were also
qualitative. Offering proposed suggestions for ways in which the tax system could be
reformed to place the United States on a more level playing field with the rest of the world.
Some of the articles were quantitative however. Rao’s article examined the short term impact
of inversion announcements on stock price. These figures came from stock price history
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gathered on a number of firms that represent the total number of firms that have done
inversions. This data along with other estimates such as the potential tax savings from various
tax reform plans and the effective tax rate estimates of inverted firms provides a strong base
on which the authors structured their recommendations and conclusions. While these
quantitative steps were a good starting point to answering the question of whether
shareholders benefit from inversions, there is much more that can be done through further
study. At the time when many of these articles were written, some of the legislation restricting
inversions had not yet been passed. Additionally, not enough time had passed to see the long
term effect of inversions on shareholders. This is one area that can now be expanded upon, to
include more data to calculate the long term effects on total shareholder wealth, rather than
limited data on short term stock price fluctuations.

Conclusion of Literature Review
The literature on the subject of corporate inversions was very helpful in shaping my
understanding of the trend as well as the progress that has been made in the field. The
background history of inversions is very demonstrative of the different ways companies have
stockpiled funds overseas and then inverted to access those funds. Over the years this has
allowed them to circumvent legislation and achieve different benefits. Additionally, the
summaries of legislation will be one of the most critical components to understanding how the
trend developed and got to the level that it currently occupies. This is because if certain
legislation under Code Section 7874 had not been passed, some of the methods that firms use
to avoid taxes and invert may never have been used because there would have been no need
for them. The most recent notices passed to support Code Section 7874 also reduce or
eliminate many of the advantages provided by inversions. This must be taken into account
because if inversions can no longer provide the benefits to shareholder wealth that they did in
the past, they would certainly be disadvantageous to shareholders.

When constructing my qualitative and quantitative methods for answering the question of
whether inversions disproportionately benefit shareholders and executives, I sought to build
upon the work of Rao, who studied the short term effects of inversion announcements on
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stock prices. I improved upon their methodology primarily by using a larger timeframe to
examine the companies. Also, I took into account more factors that impact shareholder wealth
to address the claims by Frydam, Sheppard, and other researchers who claim that inversions
maximize shareholder wealth in the long run rather than short term stock prices.

As previously mentioned, some of the proposed solutions to mitigate the inversion trend
include altering the tax system to be a friendlier environment for corporations by lowering the
tax rate and moving toward a territorial tax system. Regardless of what may appear to be the
best solution, it is important to critically examination what the most plausible solution might
be. This is because while an overhaul of the tax system might result in the most dramatic
change in the inversion trend, it is unlikely to occur because of the guaranteed loss tax
revenue. The government is much more likely to continue on the path it currently follows by
closing loopholes and issuing notices to make inversions more difficult and less profitable.

METHODOLOGY
This project was designed to be a quantitative study, that would be used as evidence to aid
investors in deciding how to handle investments in companies that announced plans to
execute a corporate inversion. In order to accomplish this, I selected a number of companies
to study and evaluated them based on a number of criteria. The companies had to have
inverted since 2008 because inversions prior to that year would not have been affected by
some of the more recent legislation and economic conditions. This is still a representative
sample because almost half of corporate inversions have occurred since 2008, even though it
has been a documented practice for over 30 years. The companies also had to be publicly
traded so that the relevant data would be available. Therefore, 28 companies of various sizes
and industries were selected as seen in Appendix A. The list was compiled primarily by cross
referencing the Bloomberg article “Tracking Tax Runaways,” and Rao’s study titled,
“Corporate Inversions and Economic Performance,” on the short term effects of inversions on
stock prices.
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After selecting the sample companies, I obtained key information to be used in the
quantitative analysis. This information included the year of inversion, industry, stock price
history, earnings per share (EPS) levels, and market cap for each company. These metrics
were chosen to evaluate the companies because they are primary inputs when measuring
shareholder wealth. Changes in stock price have an obvious impact on the shareholders
because it determines how the market value of their investments change over time.
Noteworthy changes in stock returns before and after inversions are important for investors
because it would help them determine the impact of inversions on shareholder wealth. The
standard deviation of the returns was also calculated to measure the volatility of the stock
price. Lastly, EPS is the ratio of income available for common shareholders to the number of
shares outstanding. It is useful for investors because it provides a metric for the profitability
of the company. The year of inversion for each company was obtained at the same time the
companies to be studied were determined from the sources previously mentioned. The
industry each company operates in was determined using the Mergent Online database. The
stock price history was researched using Yahoo Finance. The EPS levels and market cap for
each firm were obtained from the Calcbench database.

When analyzing the data gathered for each company, a similar approach was used for each
metric. Data was averaged for a number of years prior to the inversion and then compared to
average data for a period of time after the inversion. For the stock price, the time frame
consisted of a maximum of five years before and after the inversion. Neither set of average
data contained information from the actual inversion year. To analyze changes in the stock
price, the yearly return was calculated from historical stock prices and then averaged to get
comparable returns for pre inversion and post inversion periods. When studying the EPS, an
average was taken for all of the years prior to the inversion, and all of the years post
inversion. Then the percent change between the pre inversion and post inversion average was
calculated in order to compare all of the firms.
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Once there was a pre and post inversion average yearly return and percent change in EPS, the
data could be examined from a number of viewpoints. These viewpoints consisted of an
aggregate, industry, and firm size level.

RESULTS
When studying corporate inversions, it is interesting to note the technical details about them
in addition to their impact on shareholders. One of these details is where companies go when
they decide to reincorporate. As illustrated by the graph below, Bermuda is the most popular
destination for companies deciding to invert, followed closely by Ireland. These two
destinations represent over half of inversions. This is due to the favorable laws related to
corporate taxation in

Reincorporation Destinations

these countries. The
25

illustration includes all

22

20

20

companies determined

15

to have engaged in

8

10

corporate inversions

5

and exceeds the list of

0

8
5

4

3

3

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

companies used for the
quantitative element of
the study.

It is also interesting to note the timing of inversions. As shown in the illustration below, the
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reincorporated to Panama. Since then, over 80 companies have followed in their footsteps and
reincorporated in another country. The trend gained momentum, but years in which the
number of inversions declined can be attributed to federal legislation and tax holidays
discussed in the literature review. These events occurred around the same time periods during
which the inversion trend exhibits a decrease. Most notable is that almost half of all
inversions have taken place in the last 8 years. This shows that the practice of corporate
inversions is gaining popularity among corporate executives and will continue unless action is
taken. The impact of inversions that will be discussed next will become more widespread the
longer the practice continues. The illustration includes all companies determined to have
engaged in corporate inversions and exceeds the list of companies used for the quantitative
element of the study.

Effect on EPS
The impact on EPS for companies that engaged in a corporate inversion was the most
conclusive metric studied. When examining the average impact on all of the firms used in the
study, the percent change from years before the inversion to years after the inversion was
-189.30%. When narrowing the number of firms by industry, the results were the same in that
the percent change in EPS was negative for all industries.

The effect of inversions on EPS was also examined through the lens of firm size. The firms in
the study distributed evenly in to three groups based on market cap. The groups consisted of
less than $1 billion, between $1 billion and $10 billion, and greater than $10 billion. For firms
with a market cap below $1 billion, the percent change in EPS from pre inversion years to
post inversion years was very negative, at -577.73%. For firms between $1 billion and $10
billion, the impact on EPS was still negative but to a lesser degree, at -30.08%. Only the firms
with a market cap over $10 billion had a positive percent change in EPS, at 11.25%. The
figures on the effect of inversions on EPS previously discussed can be found in the summary
data table in Appendix B.
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Effect on the Stock Price
The change in average stock price returns from pre inversion years to post inversion years
also differed between industries and firm size. When all companies used in the study were
averaged together, the stock price returns showed a decrease from a 25.43% return to a
12.74% return. However, the standard deviation of the returns for all companies decreased
from 68.63% to 44.39%. When the results are broken down by industry, it is clear that the
stock price of companies in some industries showed improvement while others suffered. The
service industry returns improved modestly from 16.16% to 23.06%. The insurance industry
returns also rose from 3.48% to 8.24%. Lastly, firms in the manufacturing industry had
returns that increased from 6.42% to 12.17% on average. Conversely, the oil industry showed
a decrease from 23.93% to 16.25%. The health industry exhibited the worst decline in stock
price returns from 43.76% pre inversion to 7.34% post inversion. In conformity with the total
standard deviation decreasing, firms in the insurance, health, and oil industries also had lower
standard deviations related to stock price returns post inversion. Firms in the service and
manufacturing industries both had higher standard deviations after inversions took place.

At the firm size level, average stock price returns for companies with a market cap below $1
billion decreased substantially from 55.44% to 16.26%. However, the standard deviation also
decreased similar to the total average. Firms who had a market cap between $1 billion and
$10 billion had higher returns of 9.85%, up from 4.61% pre inversion. This came at the cost
of a higher standard deviation as well. Lastly, firms with a market cap higher than $10 billion
were unique in that their average stock price return decreased from 14.80% to 12.43%, but the
standard deviation for those firms also increased from 30.92% to 43.85%. The figures on the
effect of inversions on the stock price previously discussed can be found in the summary data
table in Appendix B.

Sensitivity Test
As was mentioned previously, data from the year of inversion was not included in the
calculations of either to pre or post inversion average for stock price returns or EPS. However,
I performed a sensitivity test to observe the impact of including the inversion year in the pre
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inversion average and in the post inversion average separately. The pre and post inversion
returns and the percent change in EPS were calculated without either group including data
from the inversion year. This was used as the benchmark to judge the other tests against.
When data from the inversion year was included in the pre inversion average, the pre
inversion stock price return increased slightly, and the percent change in EPS was slightly less
negative. This shows that during the inversion year, there was a slightly positive market
reaction, but no major changes to the stock price. However, when the inversion year data was
included in the post inversion averages the average stock price return more than doubled in a
positive direction. This shows that the market reaction was somewhat delayed. The
implications for this are that investors may not respond immediately after an inversion
because there is no observable change in the value of the investment. According to these
observations it takes a period of time for the market to react negatively, at which point it may
be too late for investors. However, if investors are aware of the potential negative long term
effects of inversions on stock price returns they may have time to take action. When
determining the average pre and post inversion percent change in EPS, twice the interquartile
range was used as a cutoff to identify outliers. The data tables for the sensitivity test can be
found in Appendix C. The identified outliers in the table are highlighted, and were excluded
from the average.

T-Tests
Regarding the average stock price returns and volatility of the stock price, it was seen through
the analysis that the volatility of the stock price decreased at the expense of lower returns for
inverting firms. I wanted to know whether these changes were a result of the inversions or if
there was another unknown cause. In order to determine this, I performed a series of t-tests.
The first t-test compared the stock price volatility results from the inverting firms to the S&P
500. In order to compare the group of inversion firms to the S&P 500 I first downloaded the
historical data for the S&P 500 from Yahoo Finance and calculated the annual returns for the
years 2004 through 2016. I then used these returns and simulated what the pre and post
inversion returns would have been if the firms that comprise the S&P 500 had done an
inversion for the years 2008 through 2015. Lastly, the standard deviations of those returns
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was calculated so that the t-test could be performed. The S&P statistics were then compared
to those of the inversion firms by using a two sample t-test assuming unequal variances. The
hypothesized mean difference for this test was 0, and the alpha was set to 0.05. As can be seen
in Appendix E, the two tailed p-value is smaller than the alpha value both pre and post
inversion. In addition, the absolute value of the t statistic is greater than the t critical value in
both the pre and post inversion test. Both of these results provide statistical justification to
reject the null hypothesis. This means that even before the inversion took place, there was
something that made inversion firms fundamentally different from the S&P 500.

The next set of t-tests compared the stock price returns and volatility of the inversion firms to
a matched competitor that was chosen based on industry, size, and financial strength. The list
of peer firms can be found in Appendix D. For each matched competitor, the same process for
determining the pre and post inversion average return and standard deviation was followed.
The inversion year for the paired inversion company was used as the cutoff year in simulating
how the firms would have compared during the same time period with the inversion being the
primary difference between them. Once the competitors were selected and the hypothetical
inversion year was determined I calculated the yearly stock price return for up to five years
before and after the inversion year depending on the availability of data. The historical stock
prices were drawn from Yahoo Finance, the same data source that was used in studying the
inversion firms. After determining the yearly returns, I calculated the pre and post inversion
standard deviations of those returns and averaged the returns to obtain an average pre and post
inversion stock price return that could be compared for statistical similarity to the inverting
firms. The paired sample t-test was performed four times. The four tests compared the
inversion firms to the competitors regarding pre inversion stock price returns, post inversion
stock price returns, pre inversion standard deviation of the returns, and post inversion standard
deviation of the returns. For each test, the null hypothesis was that the hypothesized mean
difference of the metric being studied would be 0, assuming an alpha value of 0.05.

For the test analyzing pre inversion average returns, the two-tailed p-value was very high at
0.86 and the t statistic was smaller than the t critical value. This shows that the inversion firms

- 22 -

Do Some Stakeholders in Publicly Traded Firms Benefit at the Expense of Others as a
Result of Corporate Inversions?
Senior Capstone Project for Ryan Hitchcock
were statistically similar to the matched competitor firms in terms of average stock price
return pre inversion. This was the expected result because pre inversion, the firms should have
been very similar to their peers that were matched based on industry, size, and financial
condition. Moving to the t-test comparing the same metric post inversion, there is a slight
change in the output. The p-value decreased to 0.56 and the absolute value of the t statistic
increased to 0.59. While there was a change, the p-value is still larger than the alpha value and
the t statistic is still smaller than the t critical value. This shows that from pre inversion to post
inversion, there was no statistically significant change to the annual stock price returns
compared to the peer firms. Therefore, any changes in annual returns for the inversion firms
can be attributed to general economic conditions and not the inversion. The output tables for
this t-test can be found in Appendix F.

The results of the t-test regarding the standard deviation of the returns produced similar
results. Pre inversion, the p-value of 0.81 implies no statistically significant difference
between the groups. This is confirmed by the t statistic which lower than the t critical value.
Once again, in regards to the volatility of the stock price the inversion firms were very similar
to their peers pre inversion. This is congruent with the expectations since the firms were
matched based on industry, size and financial condition. Similar to the test of the average
return, there was no statistically relevant change in the correlation of the returns post
inversion. The p-value of 0.53 and a low t statistic again imply no statistically significant
difference between the groups. The output tables of this t-test can be found in appendix E.

DISCUSSION
Based on the data previously summarized in the results section, there are several conclusions
that can be drawn regarding whether firms aided or harmed their shareholders through
corporate inversions. When examining the pre inversion and post inversion returns filtered by
industry, firms in the service, insurance, and manufacturing industries all exhibited
improvement. Firms in the service industry showed the most improvement, as the returns in
that industry increased by 6.9%. While the average returns for the service industry increased,
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it came at the cost of higher stock price volatility as shown by the larger standard deviation.
Firms in the manufacturing and insurance industries had slightly lower increases of their
returns by 5.75% and 4.76% respectively. However, manufacturing firms were subject to the
same consequence as service firms in the form of more volatile stock price returns.

Each firm size also displayed different benefits. Relatively small firms with a market cap
below $1 billion had a less volatile stock price through a lower standard deviation of stock
price returns. Medium sized firms, with a market cap between $1 billion and $10 billion,
benefited differently by being the only firm size group to have higher stock price returns. The
returns for medium sized firms increased by 5.24%. Relatively large firms with a market cap
above $10 billion were the only ones to have higher earnings post inversion. The EPS for
these firms increased by 11.25% on average.

While there were numerous benefits to shareholders as previously mentioned, there were
equally as many disadvantages. The only finding that was nearly unanimous across all
industries and firm sizes was that EPS was lower post inversion. Firms in the oil industry had
the worst decrease in EPS, followed closely by insurance. Another negative implication for
firms in the oil industry was that their average stock price returns were 7.68% lower post
inversion. The only other industry that had lower returns in addition to lower earnings was the
health industry. The returns post inversion for the health industry were the lowest compared to
pre inversion returns among all industries. The returns for firms in the health industry
decreased by 36.42%. This is especially significant considering the fact that the health
industry represented the industry with the most inversions in the study. The breakdown of
inversions per industry can be seen in the following diagram.
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as discussed previously. For relatively small firms, stock price returns were lower post
inversion in addition to lower average EPS offset the benefit of a less volatile stock price.
Medium sized firms also had lower EPS and had more volatile stock prices. This counteracts
the benefit to shareholders of higher average stock price returns. Lastly, shareholders in large
firms were disadvantaged through lower returns accompanied by a more volatile stock price.
These harmful effects could potentially negate the benefit large firms enjoyed in the form of
higher earnings post inversion.

Even with the noted pairs of advantages and disadvantages for firms in different industries
and of different sizes, many of the findings are called into question when comparing the
inversion firms to their competitors. While the stock price returns decreased for inversion
firms after the inversion, the same pattern was exhibited for their competitors who did not
invert. This suggests that the reduction in stock price returns was not directly caused by the
inversions, but by general economic conditions. A similar result was observed in testing the
volatility results of the inversion firms against their competitors. Non-inversion firms showed
a similar decrease in volatility compared to inversion firms over the same period of time. The
t-test showed that the difference in volatility between the inversion firms and their peers was
not statistically relevant, meaning the inversions had no significant impact on the volatility of
the annual returns.
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It is interesting that both pre and post inversion, the inversion firms remained similar to their
competitors on the basis of annual returns and volatility. However, there was something
fundamentally different about inversion firms even before the inversion when comparing their
volatility to the volatility of the S&P 500. This fundamental difference could be a pressure
that causes firms to execute inversions. Otherwise, it calls into question the actions of
management because executives are supposed to be looking out for shareholder wealth above
all else. This study shows that their decision to carry through with an inversion had no
statistically significant impact on long term shareholder wealth. Even if the inversion was
necessitated by the need to access overseas cash, management should have been more
cognizant of the fact that shareholders would not share in the benefits. Investors should keep
these facts in mind when evaluating whether a company represents a good financial
investment. If executive compensation is not aligned with shareholder wealth, it is possible
that they may make decisions such as voting on a corporate inversion, which is shown to have
no impact on shareholder wealth in the long run.

POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS
While this study addressed an important question, there are some potential limitations such as
topics that exceeded the scope of this project, and ways in which the methodology could have
been improved. An assumption made in this study is that executives of inversion firms are
benefiting in terms of additional compensation. However, the extent of the benefits they
receive from inversions was not explored. This would be an interesting topic for future studies
to build upon the degree of difference between executive and shareholder impacts resulting
from inversions. One of the most conclusive results in the study was the change in EPS from
pre inversion to post inversion. However, the issuance of new shares could have had an
impact on the results and explain the observed change. Future studies could verify the results
in this study by controlling for the number of shares outstanding in the calculation of EPS and
stock returns. Lastly the results could be fortified in future studies by increasing the number
of firms studied. As time progresses, the list of firms that complete inversions will increase.
Their data could further confirm or deny the conclusion that there are no observable benefits
to shareholder wealth caused by corporate inversions.
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Appendix A – List of companies studied

Co
ACN
AGII
ALKS
ALLE
AMAT
AON
ASPS
CVEO
ENDP
ESV
ETN
GBLI
HZNP
JAZZ
LBTYA
MDT
MYL
PGN
PNR
PRGO
QSR
RDC
SSYS
TBPH
TROX
TWGP
VRX
WMGI
XL

Inversion Year
5/26/2009
3/14/2007
5/9/2011
6/17/2013
9/24/2013
1/13/2012
5/13/2009
9/29/2014
11/5/2013
11/9/2009
5/21/2012
2/16/2010
3/19/2014
5/19/2011
2/5/2013
6/15/2014
7/14/2014
9/24/2013
3/28/2012
7/29/2013
8/26/2014
8/26/2014
4/16/2012
4/25/2013
9/26/2011
7/30/2012
6/21/2010
10/27/2014
1/9/2015

Industry
Service
Insurance
Health
Service
Manufacturing
Insurance
Service
Service
Health
Oil
Manufacturing
Insurance
Health
Health
Service
Health
Health
Oil
Manufacturing
Health
Restaurants
Oil
Manufacturing
Health
Manufacturing
Insurance
Health
Health
Insurance
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Appendix B – Summary data table of results

Industry Average
Service
Insurance
Health
Manufacturing
Oil
Restaurant
Size Average
Mkt Cap<1B
1B<Mkt Cap<10B
Mkt Cap>10B

EPS
Return Pre Return Post
-189.30%
25.43%
12.74%
-45.93%
16.16%
23.06%
-298.97%
3.48%
8.24%
-157.68%
43.76%
7.34%
-186.65%
6.42%
12.17%
-311.72%
23.93%
16.25%
16.49%
-577.73%
-30.08%
11.25%
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55.44%
4.61%
14.80%

16.26%
9.85%
12.43%

STD D Pre
STD D Post
68.63%
44.39%
34.55%
61.50%
26.65%
17.61%
96.07%
39.23%
44.53%
63.72%
83.15%
37.33%
41.96%
142.64%
32.57%
30.92%

42.09%
46.94%
43.85%
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Appendix C – Sensitivity test
Co
ACN
AGII
ALKS
ALLE
AMAT
AON
ASPS
CVEO
ENDP
ESV
ETN
GBLI
HZNP
JAZZ
LBTYA
MDT
MYL
PGN
PNR
PRGO
QSR
RDC
SSYS
TBPH
TROX
TWGP
VRX
WMGI
XL

Inversion Year Not Included in Pre or Post
Return Pre Return Post ∆ in Returns EPS % Change Outlier
-8.57%
18.49%
27.05%
14.08%
30.16%
-18.94%
-49.09%
6.69%
66.85%
60.15%
137.78%
-25.33%
-8.30%
6.53%
14.84%
29.68%
11.73%
25.63%
13.90%
55.72%

-1.47%
-22.99%
10.85%
-36.48%
158.28%
508.52%
30.98%
21.10%
48.44%
1.62%
10.12%
18.30%

-4.74%
18.05%
7.33%
4.70%
0.03%
95.11%
-33.95%
3.23%
-14.33%
71.35%
14.91%
-3.62%

-3.27%
41.04%
-3.52%
41.17%
-158.25%
-413.41%
-64.93%
-17.87%
-62.76%
69.72%
4.79%
-21.92%

29.40%
27.44%

-20.85%
9.78%

-50.25%
-17.66%

-162.16%
-160.96%
-55.53%
14.39%
-99.49%
1213.43%
-22.29%
-746.98%
111.11%
-79.60%
0.99%
-68.97%
-310.42%
-2033.33%
1382.50%
-1046.59%
-94.07%

6.31%
34.76%
28.44%
-6.39%
8.84%
15.23%
11.84%
3.61%
-8.23%
Average Pre Average Post ∆ in Returns EPS % Change
Average
38.53%
13.31%
-25.22%
-42.06%
Q1
Q3
IQR
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

-145.59%
25.86%
171.45%
-488.49%
368.75%
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Co
ACN
AGII
ALKS
ALLE
AMAT
AON
ASPS
CVEO
ENDP
ESV
ETN
GBLI
HZNP
JAZZ
LBTYA
MDT
MYL
PGN
PNR
PRGO
QSR
RDC
SSYS
TBPH
TROX
TWGP
VRX
WMGI
XL

Inversion Year Included in Pre
Return Pre Return Post ∆ in Returns
EPS % Change Outlier
4.25%
18.49%
14.24%
18.80%
27.36%
-18.94%
-46.29%
19.70%
66.85%
47.15%
126.98%
30.04%
4.56%
6.53%
1.97%
71.31%
14.23%
25.63%
11.40%
30.91%

35.05%
-1.11%
12.62%
27.65%
127.73%
375.00%
26.34%
26.24%
37.97%
4.28%
19.29%
30.49%

-4.74%
18.05%
7.33%
4.70%
0.03%
95.11%
-33.95%
3.23%
-14.33%
71.35%
14.91%
-3.62%

-39.79%
19.16%
-5.29%
-22.95%
-127.70%
-279.89%
-60.28%
-23.01%
-52.30%
67.06%
-4.38%
-34.11%

20.06%
56.14%

-20.85%
9.78%

-40.91%
-46.36%

-267.57%
-72.97%
-47.12%
12.50%
-99.48%
258.70%
-15.39%
-435.89%
493.75%
-74.44%
1120.00%
-68.42%
-351.10%
-145.21%
535.95%
-1922.03%
-83.85%

54.74%
34.76%
-19.98%
6.70%
8.84%
2.14%
9.61%
3.61%
-5.99%
Average Pre Average Post ∆ in Returns EPS % Change
Average
42.68%
13.31%
-29.37%
-39.78%
Q1
Q3
IQR
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

-95.57%
61.21%
156.78%
-409.12%
374.76%
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Co

Inversion Year Included in Post
Return Pre Return Post ∆ in Returns
EPS % Change Outlier
ACN
-8.57%
22.28%
30.85%
6.74%
0
AGII
30.16%
-5.37%
-35.53%
0
ALKS
6.69%
59.80%
53.11%
51.85%
0
ALLE
-45.27%
0
AMAT
-8.30%
14.45%
22.75%
-4.52%
0
AON
11.73%
23.50%
11.76%
41.59%
0
ASPS
0
CVEO
-175.44%
0
ENDP
-1.47%
32.87%
34.33%
-158.18%
0
ESV
-22.99%
26.25%
49.24%
-47.64%
0
ETN
10.85%
10.27%
-0.58%
11.28%
0
GBLI
-36.48%
55.10%
91.57%
-67.58%
0
HZNP
158.28%
66.63%
-91.65%
0
JAZZ
508.52%
99.39%
-409.13%
1075.12%
1
LBTYA
30.98%
-16.95%
-47.93%
0
MDT
21.10%
10.90%
-10.20%
-23.37%
0
MYL
48.44%
-3.87%
-52.30%
0
PGN
1.62%
50.76%
49.14%
-436.24%
0
PNR
10.12%
22.49%
12.37%
9.63%
0
PRGO
18.30%
15.88%
-2.42%
-70.07%
0
QSR
-164.36%
0
RDC
29.40%
-13.44%
-42.84%
-47.70%
0
SSYS
27.44%
44.37%
16.93%
-223.15%
0
TBPH
-1868.89%
1
TROX
1223.33%
1
TWGP
-595.37%
1
VRX
6.31%
73.70%
67.39%
-125.99%
0
WMGI
-6.39%
16.85%
23.24%
0
XL
11.84%
4.37%
-7.47%
0
Average Pre Average Post ∆ in Returns EPS % Change
Average
38.53%
27.74%
-10.79%
-81.58%
Q1
Q3
IQR
Lower Bound
Upper Bound

-162.81%
8.91%
171.72%
-506.25%
352.34%
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Appendix D – List of peer firms
Co
ACN
AGII
ALKS
ALLE
AMAT
AON
ASPS
CVEO
ENDP
ESV
ETN
GBLI
HZNP
JAZZ
MDT
MYL
PNR
QSR
RDC
SSYS
TBPH
TROX
VRX
WMGI
XL

Peer Firm
NIELSEN HOLDINGS NV
NAVIGATORS GROUP INC
CABOT MICROELECTRONICS CORP
GRIFFON CORP
BAKER HUGHES INC
MARSH & MCLENNAN COS
PAYCOM SOFTWARE INC
BELMOND LTD
ABRAXIS BIOSCIENCE INC
SEADRILL LTD
PACCAR INC
EMC INSURANCE GROUP INC
BIOCRYST PHARMACEUTICALS INC
ARIAD PHARMACEUTICALS INC
THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC
ECOLAB INC
NETAPP INC
BRINKER INTL INC
SANDRIDGE ENERGY INC
CAVIUM INC
PTC THERAPEUTICS INC
SENSIENT TECHNOLOGIES CORP
AGRIUM INC
NUVASIVE INC
UNUM GROUP
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Appendix E – T-test of inversion firm volatility compared to S&P 500
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Std Dev-Pre
S&P
Inversions
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean
0.1896
0.6863
Variance
0.0090
1.0372
Observations
8.0000
21.0000
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0.0000
df
21.0000
t Stat
-2.2097
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.0192
t Critical one-tail
1.7207
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.0384
t Critical two-tail
2.0796

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Std Dev-Post
S&P
Inversions
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean
0.0986
0.4527
Variance
0.0005
0.1978
Observations
7.0000
25.0000
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0.0000
df
24.0000
t Stat
-3.9629
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.0003
t Critical one-tail
1.7109
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.0006
t Critical two-tail
2.0639
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Appendix F – T-test of inversion firm returns compared to peers
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Pre Inversion Average Return
Inversions
Matched Pairs
Mean
0.2628
0.2400
Variance
0.3150
0.0986
Observations
17.0000
17.0000
Pearson Correlation
0.3623
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.0000
df
16.0000
t Stat
0.1760
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.4313
t Critical one-tail
1.7459
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.8625
t Critical two-tail
2.1199

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Post Inversion Average Return
Inversions
Matched Pairs
Mean
0.1176
0.1502
Variance
0.0537
0.0409
Observations
24.0000
24.0000
Pearson Correlation
0.2327
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.0000
df
23.0000
t Stat
-0.5920
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.2798
t Critical one-tail
1.7139
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.5596
t Critical two-tail
2.0687
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Appendix G – T-test of inversion firm volatility compared to peers
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Pre Inversion Standard Deviation
Inversions
Matched Pairs
Mean
0.6708
0.6204
Variance
1.1469
0.2939
Observations
18.0000
18.0000
Pearson Correlation
0.5717
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.0000
df
17.0000
t Stat
0.2424
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.4057
t Critical one-tail
1.7396
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.8114
t Critical two-tail
2.1098

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Post Inversion Standard Deviation
Inversions
Matched Pairs
Mean
0.4735
0.4056
Variance
0.2075
0.1593
Observations
23.0000
23.0000
Pearson Correlation
0.2782
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.0000
df
22.0000
t Stat
0.6324
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.2668
t Critical one-tail
1.7171
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.5336
t Critical two-tail
2.0739
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